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COMMENT

Failing to Speak for Itself: The Res Ipsa
Loquitur Presumption of Parental
Culpability and its Greater Consequences
ALLYSON

B. LEVINEt

Without a word, Korczak took off the child's shirt, placed him behind
the fluoroscope, and turned off the overhead light. Everyone could see
the boy's heart beating rapidly on the screen. "Don't ever forget this
sight," Korczak told them. "Before you raise a hand to a child, before
you administer any kind of punishment, remember what his frightened
heart looks like." 1
INTRODUCTION

After her son, Jullian, sustained second-degree burns
on his feet and buttocks, Hyacinth brought him to the
t J.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School, 2009;
B.A., Brandeis University, 2006. First and foremost, I am forever indebted to
Margaret A. Burt for her constant encouragement, inspiration, and advice. I
am incredibly grateful to Emily Eaton and Shaina Kovalsky for their abundant
support, dry humor, meticulous editing, and unwavering willingness to listen to
rants about child abuse. I would also like to thank my parents, Robert Levine
and Rise Friedman, for teaching me the value of a happy childhood, a solid
education, and a good Winston Churchill quote. Special thanks to Lauren A.
Levine, Regina L. Readling, Gary Solomon, Anne E. Wilson, and Professor Jim
Wooten for providing insightful comments and valuable criticism on earlier
drafts, and to the members of the Buffalo Law Review, particularly Lindsay J.
Anastasi and Gabrielle C. Petersen, for their hard work.
1. BErrY JEAN LiFTON, THE KING OF CHILDREN: A BIOGRAPHY OF JANUSZ

KORCZAK 144 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 1988). I am grateful to Shaina
Kovalsky for bringing this anecdote to my attention.
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Nassau County Burn Unit. There, the attending physician
discovered that about six percent of Jullian's total body
surface was covered in burns. 2 He questioned Hyacinth
about the source of the burns. She claimed that while
bathing, Jullian managed to turn on the hot water and
scald himself. 3 The doctor quickly realized that her
explanation could not possibly be accurate. If it were true,
Jullian would have had burns on his thighs where the
water would have reached him, as well as splash marks
elsewhere on his body. 4 Instead, Jullian exhibited the telltale signs of an immersion burn. Applying the res ipsa
loquitur presumption found in Family Court Act section
1046(a)(ii), 5 the court found that Jullian was abused and
held Hyacinth responsible for his injuries. The provision
provides that a prima facie case of child abuse or neglect may be
established by evidence of (1) an injury to a child that would not
ordinarily occur absent an act or omission of the parent or other
person responsible for the care of the child and (2) that the parent
or such other person
was the caretaker of the child when the
6
injury occurred.

Once the Department of Social Services proved that the
injuries were consistent with child abuse, it established a
prima facie case against Hyacinth. Then, "the burden of
going forward shift[ed] to the parent or other person
responsible for [the] care of the child to offer a reasonable
and adequate explanation of how the child sustained the
injury. ' 7 Hyacinth failed to rebut the presumption of
parental culpability against her, because she could not
provide an adequately plausible explanation for the burns.
The court therefore held that Jullian was an abused child.8
On appeal, the court had to weigh Jullian's future safety
and health interests against Hyacinth's rights as a parent.

2. Comm'r of Soc. Servs. of New York ex rel. Jullian L. v. Hyacinth L., 619
N.Y.S.2d 762, 763 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 2008).
6. Comm'r of Soc. Servs., 619 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
7. Id.
8.Id.
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To ensure his safety, the court decided to place Jullian in
the custody of the Commissioner of Social Services, because
"an erroneous failure to provide protection for a child in an
[A]rticle 10 proceeding may have disastrous consequences."9
The decision seems to have been drawn from common
sense, yet not all cases are as clearly indicative of child
abuse.
While historically used as a theory of negligence, the
res ipsa presumption has also been used in New York State
family courts for over four decades to explain what logic
already dictates-i.e., parents who have no plausible
explanation for their children's suspicious injuries are likely
guilty of abusing them. 10 Still, not all unexplained and
severe injuries speak for themselves, and this becomes a
more serious problem when the victim is too young to speak
for himself. There are consequences that result from a rule
that presumes parental culpability, especially one that is
not applied uniformly.
This Comment will first explain the historical
background of the res ipsa loquitur presumption, and its
subsequent codification in the Family Court Act. Then, it
will explore the six factors that New York courts use to
evaluate whether a parent has rebutted the presumption,
and the inconsistencies that occur in its application. Lastly,
the Comment will address the greater consequences of the
res ipsa presumption's application and the findings of abuse
that result from it, and advocate for change to increase
consistency and transparency in such proceedings.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND-CODIFYING COMMON SENSE
Presiding over a child protective proceeding in 1965,
Judge Harold A. Felix was faced with a problem: there was
an unquestionably battered, one-month-old child whose
parents could not provide a reasonable explanation for his
9. Id. at 764.
10. Although I tend to refer to the respondents in Article Ten proceedings as
"parents," this is not entirely accurate. Section 1012(g) of the Family Court Act
has been interpreted broadly to include any caregiver or person responsible for
the child. This may include neighbors, paramours, babysitters, and other family
members. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(a), (g) (McKinney Supp. 2008); In re
Nathaniel 'T," 696 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275-76 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1999); In re
Maureen G., 426 N.Y.S.2d 384, 387-90 (Fain. Ct. 1980).
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injuries. However, there was no direct proof that the
parents abused the child. Judge Felix wrote in his decision,
"Proof of abuse by a parent or parents is difficult because
such actions ordinarily occur in the privacy of the home
without outside witnesses."1 1 Then, without pretense,
precedent, or statutory influence, he continued:
Therefore in this type of proceeding affecting a battered child
syndrome, I am borrowing from the evidentiary law of negligence
the principle of "res ipsa loquitur" and accepting the proposition
that the condition of the child speaks for itself, thus permitting an
inference of neglect to be drawn from proof of the child's age and
condition, and that the latter is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if the parent who has the responsibility
and control of an infant is protective and non-abusive. And
without satisfactory explanation I would be constrained to make a
finding of fact of neglect on the part of a parent or parents and
thus afford the court the opportunity to inquiry [sic] into any
mental, physical or emotional inadequacies of the parents and/or
to enlist any guidance or counseling the1 2parents might need. This
is the Court's responsibility to the child.

There was a similar case the following year in
Westchester County Family Court. Citing the application of
res ipsa loquitur found in Judge Felix's opinion, the court,
seemingly sua sponte, adopted its own rules of evidence
regarding the case. The decision stated that the "burden of
proof relating to the allegations of the petition remains
upon the [p]etitioner to be established by a preponderance
of the relevant, competent and material evidence."'13 The
court also held that once the petitioner has shown that the
child suffered injuries while in the care of his parents, then
the petitioner has established a prima facie case and it
becomes the parent's burden to come forward with an
explanation for those injuries.' 4 In lieu of legislation, the
courts continued to utilize the rule. 15 In 1970, the doctrine
was codified in the revised Article Ten of the Family Court
11. In re S, 259 N.Y.S.2d 164, 164-65 (Fain. Ct. 1965).
12. Id. at 165. See also Monrad G. Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child
Protection,66 COLuM. L. REV. 679, 698-99 (1966) (quoting In re S).
13. In re Young, 270 N.Y.S.2d 250, 253 (Fam. Ct. 1966).
14. Id.
15. See George J. Alexander, 1966 Survey of New York Law: Family Law, 18
SYRAcusE L. REV. 383, 389 (1966).
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Act, 16 as a rule of evidence for use in child protective
proceedings. The statute states that
proof of injuries sustained by a child or of the condition of a child
of such a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist
except by reason of the acts or omissions of the parent or other
person responsible for the care of such child shall be prima facie
evidence of child abuse or neglect, as the
case may be, of the
17
parent or other person legally responsible.

County family courts quickly interpreted the new law
as creating a "statutory presumption" of child abuse or
neglect, rebuttable only when parents presented a
reasonable and satisfactory explanation for their child's
injuries.' 8 According to this interpretation, once the
petitioner (i.e., a child protection agency, usually the
county's department of social services or its administration
for children's services or child welfare) has established that
a child's injuries are consistent with abuse, the burden of
coming forward with an explanation shifts to the child's
parents to prove that they did not inflict the injuries. In the
earlier stages of the rule's application, a few courts
articulated the rule as shifting the burden of proof to the
parents after the child protection agency met its burden of
establishing a prima facie case. 19
16. In re Roman, 405 N.Y.S.2d 899, 903 (Fain. Ct. 1978). See also Douglas J.
Besharov, State Intervention to Protect Children: New York's Definitions of
"ChildAbuse" and "Child Neglect," 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 723, 725-27 (1981).
17. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 2008).
18. See, e.g., In re Edwards, 335 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579-80 (Fam. Ct. 1972).
19. See, e.g., In re Philip M., 589 N.Y.S.2d 31, 32 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1992)
('"The statute thereby shifts the burden of proof to the parents to rebut evidence
of abuse by providing a 'reasonable and adequate explanation of how the
injuries were sustained."' (quoting In re Erin "QQ," 270 N.Y.S.2d 502, 502 (App.
Div. 3d Dep't 1992))), aff'd, 624 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1993); In re Jesse S., 543
N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1989) ("Once a prima facie case has been
established by the petitioner, the burden shifts to the alleged abuser to offer a
satisfactory explanation to rebut the evidence."); In re Cerda, 495 N.Y.S.2d 47,
48 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1985) ("Once the statutory conditions are met and a
prima facie case of neglect is established the 'burden of coming forward with
proof' shifts from the petitioner to the parent, who is then required to offer a
satisfactory explanation for the child's injuries." (quoting In re Young, 270
N.Y.S.2d 250, 253 (Fam. Ct. 1966))); In re Roman, 405 N.Y.S.2d 899, 903 (Faro.
Ct. 1978) ('To insure that the secrecy of the acts themselves would not leave
battered children unprotected, the Courts redistributed the burden of proof by
borrowing the principle of res ipsa loquitur from negligence law."); In re Fred S.,
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However, in 1993, in the case of In re Philip M., the
Court of Appeals clarified the rule by holding that "the
burden of proving child abuse always rests with [the]
petitioner. '20 Once the petitioner establishes a prima facie
case of abuse, there is a presumption of parental
culpability. Yet, parents may testify or present evidence to
rebut the presumption. Despite the establishment of a
prima facie case of abuse or neglect, the court does not have
to find that the parents are abusive; rather the
"respondents may simply rest without attempting to rebut
the presumption and permit the court to decide the case on
the strength of petitioner's evidence or, alternatively, they
may present evidence which challenges the establishment
of the prima facie case. '"21 The Court of Appeals also clearly
articulated the different types of evidence that parents may
present to rebut the presumption. It suggested that parents
may present evidence that the child was not in their care
when the injury occurred, or that the injury was the result
of an accident. They may also question the evidence
presented that the child had an injury consistent with child
abuse.22
Today, the statute is frequently cited in Article Ten
proceedings to establish a finding of abuse or neglect,
especially when there are unexplained and severe injuries.
However, different interpretations continue to emerge, as
judges grant weight to the different factors before them.
More importantly, courts still struggle with the notion23of
the statutory presumption and its consistent application.

322 N.Y.S.2d 170, 177 (Fam. Ct. 1971) ("[T]hen petitioner is deemed to have
established a prima facie case and the burden of going forward with the proof,
shifts from the petitioner to the respondents who are then required to offer
satisfactory explanation concerning injuries.").
20. 624 N.E.2d 168, 172 (N.Y. 1993).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See In re Ashley RR., 816 N.Y.S.2d 580, 582 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2006)
("Although generally referred to as a presumption, this method of proof does not
create a true presumption . . . ."); Albany County Dep't for Children, Youth &
Families v. Ana P., 827 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 (Fain. Ct. 2006) ('To say that this is a
confusing area of the law is an understatement of presumptively large
dimensions.").
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II. AN IRREBUTTABLE

PRESUMPTION?: FACTORS CONSIDERED
BY COURTS WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER A PARENT HAS
REBUTTED THE PRESUMPTION OF PARENTAL CULPABILITY

New York State family courts and the appellate
divisions of supreme courts consider six different factors in
their analysis of whether a parent has rebutted the
presumption of parental culpability. Although courts do not
explicitly refer to these six factors in their decisions, they
are implicit in the case law. Recognizing this pattern, and
then compiling the six factors, required a comprehensive
study of the reported cases that invoked Family Court Act
section 1046(a)(ii), the res ipsa loquitur presumption, or24
other cases that related to those terms or cited them.
Judges or child welfare attorneys seeking guidance or an
overall pattern on this issue must rely on published case
law. It is difficult to determine the extent to which these
cases are representative of the broader use of the
presumption, but the cases cite one another, creating a
coherent body of case law. Nonetheless, the exclusive use of
published cases remains a necessary limitation of this
study. In an attempt to create consistency and
transparency, it is helpful to make explicit what courts
have left implicit.
The six major factors that courts evaluate in res ipsa
cases are the respondent's presentation of: (A) a consistent
and plausible account of events; (B) corroborating expert
testimony; (C) a diligent effort to seek medical treatment;
(D) a single injury with no other marks that are suggestive
of abuse; (E) the expression of emotion at the fact-finding
hearing; and, when possible, (F) a plausible alternative
explanation for the injury. Understandably, these factors
mirror society's conception of parental obligations, and are
therefore based on socially acceptable parenting methods.
For example, a reasonable and caring parent diligently
seeks medical treatment for his injured child, regardless of

24. This study began with a list of cases compiled by Margaret A. Burt, Esq.,
a child advocate who specializes in child welfare, foster care, adoptions, and
child abuse and neglect cases. After reading all of the cases that Burt compiled,
and then reading all of the cases cited within those cases, as well as conducting
several Westlaw searches, a nexus of cases emerged. As demonstrated by the
body of case law cited in this Comment, approximately 150 res ipsa cases
provided the foundation on which the six factors and subsequent analysis rests.
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the fact that it could expose him to charges of child abuse. If
any of the aforementioned factors are not present, it is more
than likely that the family court will take note and
ultimately enter an order finding that the child was abused
or neglected.
An analysis of the relevant case law demonstrates that
it is extremely difficult for parents to rebut a claim of res
ipsa loquitur abuse or neglect. Obviously, this difficulty is
partly due to the nature of the injuries and illnesses that
lend themselves to the application of the res ipsa doctrine.
The cases that invoke the statutory presumption usually
involve extremely egregious physical injuries or sexual
abuse resulting in the transmission of a sexually
transmitted infection. 25 Furthermore, the children are often
very young, and therefore unable to articulate the source of
their injuries. Thus, the presumption is difficult to rebut,
because the severity of the injury and the age of the child
make it seemingly obvious that the parent is responsible for
25. See, e.g., In re Fantaysia L., 828 N.Y.S.2d 497 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2007)
(three-year-old child contracted gonorrhea); In re Sanah J., 806 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79
(App. Div. 2005) ("[A] child, who was three months old, sustained 11 rib
fractures, a fractured arm and leg, cerebral edema, retinal hemorrhaging, a
subdural bilateral hematoma, and bruises."). See generally Paulsen, supra note
12, at 698-703.
While the majority of the cases that invoke the presumption involve
egregious physical injuries or in the case of sexual abuse, a sexually
transmitted disease, it is also important to note that the presumption can be
applied in cases involving obvious and severe emotional impairment. In the case
of In re Keith R., 474 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Fam. Ct. 1984), a five-year-old child's
extreme emotional disturbance and knowledge about sexual intercourse
activated the presumption. The child told the psychiatrists examining him that
he wanted "to be a killer when he grows up." Id. at 256. He also "manipulated
two anatomically correct dolls to engage them in a parody of sexual intercourse,
ending in shaking spasms" and had a wealth of knowledge about "sexual
concepts." Id. The court noted that a child would not have this level of
emotional impairment were it not for the "acts or omissions" of an abusive or
neglectful parent. Id. at 257-58 (quoting N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(ii) (Supp.
2008)). The court found that the child had to have obtained his knowledge and
emotional impairment from "someplace" and his mother was his primary
caretaker and therefore, she was culpable for the emotional abuse. Id. at 258.
The mother failed to offer any explanation to rebut the presumption against
her, and subsequently the court entered a finding of neglect. Id. Although the
presumption was successfully applied in this case, it is far more common for it
to be applied in cases involving physical and sexual abuse, because the evidence
of abuse tends to be overwhelmingly obvious and compelling. Id. at 257 ("Every
reported decision that the Court has found construing this section [1046(a)(ii)]
involved physical injuries sustained by the child.").
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maltreatment or poor supervision at the very least. Where
the evidence of abuse or neglect is not particularly
compelling, however, the court will simply dismiss for
failure to establish a prima facie case based on a
preponderance of the evidence, rather than force parents to
26
present a satisfactory explanation for the injuries present.
Nevertheless, where the petitioner has established that a
prima facie case exists, the case law demonstrates that it is
almost impossible for parents to rebut the presumption of
parental responsibility.
A. A Consistent and PlausibleAccount of Events
First, once a prima facie case of child abuse has been
established, the burden of explanation shifts to the parents
to show that they are not responsible.2 7 It is not enough for
parents to deny that they knew of the injuries or how they
were inflicted because such a denial does not truly explain
the origin of the injuries, especially when the parents were
the sole caretakers of the child when the injuries were
inflicted. 28 It is also insufficient to claim that the injuries
were the result of an accident if more elaborate details are
not provided. 29 Rather, parents must provide a credible
account of events in which their child could have sustained
the injuries, and they must be consistent in their narrative
of what occurred. Parents often fail to properly explain the
nature of their child's injuries, resulting in a finding of
abuse. For example, in the case of In re Daqwuan G., the
court found that the mother failed to rebut the
presumption, noting that the mother's explanation was
"contradictory, implausible, or otherwise unreasonable or
lacking in credibility. ' 30 Furthermore, in cases where both
parents are respondents, the two must testify to the same
26. See, e.g., In re Tony B., Jr., 841 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
2007); In re Shawna "K," 716 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2000); In re
Nassau County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 575 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1991).
27. In re Philip M., 624 N.E.2d at 172.
28. 1 GARY SOLOMON, PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LAW GUARDIANS: REPRESENTING
CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS 221 (2005).

29. See, e.g., In re Malta L., 747 N.Y.S.2d 765, 765 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
2002).
30. 814 N.Y.S.2d 723, 725 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006).
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account of events, because their failure to recall the
incident in the same way will easily raise the suspicion of
abuse.31

B. Presentationof Expert Testimony CorroboratingTheir
Explanation
Even when caregivers have a compelling explanation
for the injuries that led to the petition, it is essential that
they also present expert testimony, usually from a medical
professional, which corroborates their explanation. While
this is not statutorily required, courts are hesitant to accept
a parent's explanation without additional proof. 32 This is in
part because the petitioner has already established a prima
facie case that the child has been abused, and has usually
done so using testimony from medical experts. 33 It then
becomes the respondent's burden to refute this expert
testimony by providing an explanation. Thus, respondents
must often present their own experts to contradict the
petitioner's evidence. 34 Expert medical testimony is
extremely important: in the majority of cases where the res

31. See, e.g., In re Cerda, 495 N.Y.S.2d 47, 48 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1985).
32. See, e.g., In re C. Children, 616 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1994) (noting that the mother did not offer any evidence to rebut medical
testimony); In re James P., 525 N.Y.S.2d 38, 40 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1988)
(noting that the mother did not offer any medical testimony and failed to rebut
the presumption).
33. See, e.g., In re Marc A., 754 N.Y.S.2d 45, 47 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2003)
("[A] prima facie case of child abuse and/or neglect was clearly established by
the expert medical testimony of.. . a pediatrician trained in child abuse.'); In re
Shetonya W., 610 N.Y.S.2d 235, 236 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1994) (finding that
respondent's explanation was "discredited by uncontradicted expert medical
testimony"); In re William W., Jr., 510 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1986) (finding that a prima facie case was established after child explained
injury to four witnesses and doctor testified that the child's wrist injury was
most likely inflicted with a rope).
34. See, e.g., In re Eric "CC," 653 N.Y.S.2d 983, 984 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1997) (noting that at the fact-finding hearing the parents attempted to rebut
the presumption
by "present[ing]
the
testimony of a
pediatric
geneticist/physician who evaluates and attends to children with birth defects
and genetic diseases"); New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel. H. and J.
Children v. Carmen J., 619 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994) (noting
that parents presented an expert in an attempt to rebut the presumption by
proving that the child's injuries were "the result of an accidental fall out of a
bathtub").
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ipsa presumption was rebutted by parents, medical experts
35
strongly corroborated the parents' account of events.
Conversely, courts often cite medical testimony that
in
contradicts the respondents' explanations in decisions
36
which respondents fail to rebut the presumption.
In addition, it may be necessary for respondents to
present the testimony of an expert in a field other than
medicine. For instance, in the case of In re Damen M., the
parents maintained that their eight-week-old daughter had
sustained first- and second-degree burns when their hot
water shut-off valve malfunctioned and allowed a sudden
stream of hot water to scald their baby. 37 The
Administration for Children's Services presented medical
testimony indicating that the mother had immersed her
child in the scalding water. To refute this testimony, the
mother offered the testimony of an engineer, who stated
that the valve did often malfunction, but would not present
a problem if the person using the water turned on both the
hot and cold water valves at the same time.38 The court
weighed the engineer's testimony, but still found that the
mother was abusive. 39 As this case demonstrates, the court
is free to weigh the testimony of any experts presented,
including its own.

35. See, e.g., In re Zachary "MM," 714 N.Y.S.2d 557, 560-61 (App. Div. 3d
Dep't 2000); In re Anthony R.C., Jr., 570 N.Y.S.2d 205, 205-06 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1991); In re BW,N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14, 1995, at 32 (Fam. Ct. 1995).
36. See, e.g., In re Kayla C., 797 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2005)
(noting that the medical expert stated that baby's constant "spitting up was not
interfering with her ability to gain weight"); In re Kortney C., 770 N.Y.S.2d 758,
759-60 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004) (crediting the testimony of a medical expert
who opined that child's injuries could be the result of an accident, but could not

have occurred the way caretaker explained that they did); In re Julissa "II,"629
N.Y.S.2d 334, 335 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1995) (noting that child's doctor testified
that injuries were not caused by accident).
37. 765 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2003).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 348-49. See also In re Chaquill R., 865 N.Y.S.2d 716 (App. Div. 3d
Dep't 2008). In that case, a ten-month-old child "suffered second and third
degree burns on his buttocks and thighs from scalding hot water in a bathtub."
Id. at 717. The respondent claimed that the burns were the result of a defective
water heater. The court relied in part on a plumber's report, which stated that
"while the control on the water heater was set at a hot cycle, the tank was
functional." Id. at 717-18. Subsequently, it affirmed the family court's finding
of abuse. Id. at 718-19.
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In some cases, the court may hold an expert to a
particularly high standard. In the case of In re Peter R., the
family court called a pediatric neurologist as an
independent expert, after both parties had their experts
testify. 40 The independent expert testified that the mother's
explanation that her son had fallen from a couch or
kitchenette was plausible and that her son's skull fracture
could have been the result of such an accident. 41 On appeal,
the Supreme Court, Appellate Division found that the
family court should not have relied on the testimony of the
independent expert, because he never met the family, "did
not review the parents' hearing testimony, and reached his
conclusion that the skull fracture could have been caused
either by the fall from the couch or the kitchenette incident
without specifically considering relevant factors such as the
height and velocity of these reported falls and the force
used. '42 Though the appellate court felt that it was
important for the independent expert to consider the
velocity and height of the child's fall from a piece of
furniture, such considerations may not have occurred to the
independent expert who practiced in the field of neurology,
not physics.
C. Diligent Efforts to Seek Medical Care
The parent's diligence in obtaining medical treatment is
another crucial factor in the court's determination of
whether the parent has rebutted the presumption. The
court must decide on a case-by-case basis "whether the
parents have provided an acceptable course of medical
treatment for their child in light of all the surrounding
circumstances." 43 This factor is often cited in decisions,
particularly in cases in which the parents waited several
days to obtain medical treatment or even failed to seek it at
all. 44 Perhaps the weight given to this factor is due to the

40. 779 N.Y.S.2d 137, 139 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004).

41. Id.
42. Id. at 140.
43. In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1014 (N.Y. 1979).

44. See, e.g., In re Peter R., 779 N.Y.S.2d at 138 (parents waited three days);
In re Christopher C., 631 N.Y.S.2d 666, 666-67 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1995)
(mother failed to seek treatment); In re Jorge S., 621 N.Y.S.2d 66, 66 (App. Div.
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assumption that parents who were truly concerned about
their children's health, rather than the possibility of being
charged with child abuse, would have immediately sought
medical treatment for them. 45 In some cases, the court will
weigh the severity of the injuries against the amount of
time it took for the parent to seek medical treatment. For
example, in the case of In re Seamus K, the court held that
the child was neglected, because the father had failed to
take his severely injured infant son to the hospital after
ninety minutes. 46 The court found that a reasonable parent,
"confronted with a two-month-old child who was screaming,
pale, acting strangely, vomiting, refusing to eat and
displaying seizure-like symptoms would have summoned
emergency medical aid and would not have waited
approximately 90 minutes for the child's other parent to
arrive home from work to assess the situation."47 However,
in cases in which the injuries are less severe, parents are
not expected to seek medical treatment as quickly. Along
these lines, in the case of In re Brandyn "' a one-year-old
48
sustained a fractured tibia while in his father's care.
Nevertheless, due to the relatively less serious nature of the
injury, the parents were able to rebut the presumption of
parental culpability, despite the fact that they had not
sought medical care until the day after the incident. 49 Thus,
to overcome the burden of explanation, parents must seek
adequate medical care for their children in a timely fashion
relative to the injuries sustained.

1st Dep't 1995) (mother failed to seek prompt treatment); In re C. Children, 616
N.Y.S.2d 644, 645 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994) (parent waited two days); In re
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 612 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994) (mother
did not seek treatment promptly).
45. See In re Keith R., 474 N.Y.S.2d 254, 258 (Fam. Ct. 1984) ("Parents are
responsible, in the first instance, for the welfare of their children. They are, and
must be held to be, the first line of defense against injury and impairment.").
46. 822 N.Y.S.2d 168, 173 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2006) (Crew III, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
47. Id.
48. 716 N.Y.S.2d 830, 831 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2000).
49. Id. at 831-32.
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D. Presenceof a Single Injury Which Is Inconsistent with
Abuse
Respondents who demonstrate that the child sustained
a single injury and no other marks or bruises consistent
with mistreatment are able to rebut the presumption more
easily than those whose children exhibit multiple injuries
and telltale bruises or belt marks. 50 In the former set of
cases, the single injury in question obviously cannot be one
that is symptomatic of child abuse. While this may seem
like common sense, parents have tried to deny abuse
despite the presence of physical injuries that are
unmistakably indicative of maltreatment. For example, in
the case of In re Randy V., an eighteen-month-old child
sustained first- and second-degree burns after being burnt
with a clothes iron.5 1 The court noted that the photographs
of the burn clearly showed the "distinct shape and image of
the face plate of an iron, with even the imprint of the steam
holes visible on the child's skin. ' 52 Burns of this nature are
rarely accidental, and in fact reveal that the scorching
53
object was pressed into the child's skin.
Many cases, however, involve injuries with slightly
more elusive origins. In these cases, the court will often
look to the number, type, and frequency of the injuries
sustained. Children who sustain various repeated and
unexplained injuries of a severe nature will be deemed
abused. Moreover, when a child sustains multiple injuries
on several occasions, the respondent cannot rebut the
presumption by claiming that each injury represents an
accidental and isolated incident, because "the credibility of
the 'accident' explanation diminishes as the instances of

50. See generally James Tuthill Weston, The Pathology of Child Abuse, in
THE BATTERED CHILD 77, 91-96 (Ray E. Heifer & C. Henry Kempe eds., 1968).
51. 786 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824-25 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2004).
52. Id. at 825.
53. Id. See also Comm'r of Soc. Servs. of New York ex rel. Jullian L. v.
Hyacinth L., 619 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994) (noting that
mother claimed that child burnt himself by turning on water in the bathtub, yet
child possessed "no burns on the front of his thighs where the water would have
been expected to land, and that there were no splash marks on the child"); In re
William W., Jr., 510 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1986) (noting that
child had an injury, which was described by doctor as "classic for a rope burn').
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similar alleged 'accidental' injury increase." 54 However,
when the child has a single injury and no other signs of
abuse, courts will entertain55the possibility of an accident or
an alternative explanation.
E. An AppropriateAmount of Emotion
Parental emotion is a factor that at times has affected
the court's determination of the parents' credibility or
ability to rebut prima facie evidence of abuse. Recalling the
testimony of a respondent father, whose young son had
approximately 100 to 150 diffuse retinal hemorrhages, as
well as other injuries, which suggested shaken baby
syndrome, Family Court Judge Friedman wrote that the
father "left virtually everyone in the courtroom with the
proverbial 'lump in the throat.' '5 6 She felt that there was no
possible way that a father with such an outpouring of
emotion and concern could possibly harm his child in the
manner alleged. Judge Friedman went on to argue that this
case could not possibly be "a true res ipsa case" of abuse,
because based on the parent's demonstration of concern, the
injuries could never speak for themselves.57 In contrast, in a
case where the parents failed to rebut the presumption, the
court specifically cited the parents' testimony, which was
delivered without emotion or concern, as evidence of
parental responsibility. 58 Although the weight given to

54. In re Vincent M., 597 N.Y.S.2d 309, 313 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1993)
(quoting People v. Henson, 304 N.E.2d 358, 363 (N.Y. 1973)); see also In re
Briana R., 653 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766-67 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1997) (quoting In re
Cerda, 495 N.Y.S.2d 47, 48 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1985)).
55. Compare In re Jorela L., 635 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1995) (holding that a lower court properly discounted a medical examiner's

testimony that child died of natural causes, because the child had numerous
injuries at her death), and In re John Z., No. 15654-05, 2006 WL 3069293, at *3
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. Oct. 27, 2006) (noting the "timing and sheer quantity of injuries
to such a little child'), with In re A.G. & K.G., Jr., N.Y. L.J., Jan. 13, 1992, at
25-26 (Fam. Ct. 1992) (holding that presumption was rebutted where father
argued that child contracted chlamydia perinatally, "because the physical
examination of [the child] revealed no evidence of bruising, scarring or trauma
to that site," and because of "the absence of psychological damage" commonly
associated with victims of sexual abuse).
56. In re Sem J.B., N.Y. L.J., Nov. 13, 1997, at 30 (Fain. Ct. 1997).
57. Id.
58. In re Seamus K., 822 N.Y.S.2d 168, 172 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2006); see
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demonstrable
emotion in a parent's testimony is
understandable, this factor may place an unnecessary
burden on parents who are particularly nervous or
unfamiliar with the family court system and believe that
their child may be taken away if they make the wrong
statements or appear unstable in any way. Alternatively, it
also allows a particularly calculating parent to elicit
undeserved sympathy from the court.
F. A PlausibleAlternate Explanation
Respondents capable of coming forth with an alternate
explanation for their child's injuries, such as the presence of
another caretaker, may be able to rebut the presumption. If
the parents are the sole caretakers during the time when
the injury occurred, and yet fail to sufficiently explain their
child's injuries, the presumption applies and is not likely to
be rebutted. 59 Even if the parent was not the perpetrator, it
is enough that the child was solely in the parent's custody
when the abuse likely took place. 60
If, however, the parents establish the presence of an
additional caretaker or that the child was not in their
custody during the critical period, then the court may weigh
that evidence and determine that the parents rebutted the
presumption. 61 In the case of In re Zachary "MM'" the
parents' three-month-old son had a depressed skull fracture
as well as fifteen other fractures of his legs, ribs, and
wrist.62 Yet, the appellate court affirmed the family court's
also In re F. Children, 577 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1991) (holding
that respondent failed to rebut the presumption where she was in attendance,

but failed to show interest at the proceedings).
59. See, e.g., In re TYanna M., 811 N.Y.S.2d 118, 119 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
2006); In re Aniyah F., 788 N.Y.S.2d 119, 120-21 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004); In re
Infinite G., 783 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004).
60. See, e.g., In re Lauren B., 607 N.Y.S.2d 77, 78 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994);
In re Ruth McI., 528 N.Y.S.2d 385, 385 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1988).
61. See, e.g., In re Nyomi A.D., 783 N.Y.S.2d 596, 598 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
2004) (holding that parents were not responsible for child's injuries when they
were not at home and child was in the care of babysitter when injured); In re
Kristen B., 724 N.Y.S.2d 303, 303 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2001) (holding that
parent rebutted presumption by showing that child was not in respondent's care
when injured, and noting that neighbor who babysat for the child did not
testify).
62. 714 N.Y.S.2d 557, 558 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2000).
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finding that the parents rebutted the presumption. The
parents established that the babysitter had cared for the
child during the period when his injuries occurred. 63 The
Supreme Court, Appellate Division found that:
Although the child was also in his parents' care during the
relevant time period, viewing the evidence as a whole and in
consideration of the timing of the injuries and the finding that the
child care provider abused the child, we conclude Family Court did
not err in holding that petitioner failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that respondents abused Zachary,
particularly in light of the fact that respondents repeatedly sought
medical attention for their son.64

The parents rebutted the presumption of parental
culpability by presenting evidence that clearly showed that
their child care provider had abused their infant.
Respondents' cases are also strengthened by their
ability to provide a reasonable, medically-sound, alternate
explanation for the injuries present. Here, In re A.G. &
K.G., Jr. is instructive. 65 In this case, the parents provided
the court with persuasive medical evidence that
demonstrated that their young child had acquired
66
chlamydia perinatally, rather than through sexual abuse.
The court found that the explanation offered was
substantiated by medical literature and "conceivable within
a reasonable degree of medical certainty. ' 67 This
explanation led the court to find that the parents had not
sexually abused their child, and due to this finding, the
court dismissed the petition against them. 68 In contrast, in
the case of In re Mathew D., the court found both parents
abusive where they argued that their child suffered from
osteogenesis imperfecta, a rare disease more commonly
known as "brittle bone disease. ' 69 In this case, the medical
testimony revealed that the child's fractures were

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 559-62.
Id. at 561.
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 13, 1992, at 25 (Fain. Ct. 1992).
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
Id.
641 N.Y.S.2d 526, 527-31 (Fam. Ct. 1996).
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suggestive of abuse, and no new fractures had appeared
while the child was in the hospital or subsequently in his
foster care placement. 70 Lastly, and most damaging to the
parents' explanation, the child tested negative for the
disease, leading both medical experts to discredit any
possibility of the parents' explanation being true. 71 As these
cases demonstrate, alternative explanations that are wellgrounded medically and substantiated by the evidence
presented greatly help rebut the presumption of parental
responsibility. However, when the evidence does not
support the alternative explanation in any way, the
respondents' credibility diminishes quickly.
In sum, parents facing the statutory presumption found
in section 1046(a)(ii) should: (A) be consistent and thorough
in their explanations; (B) present expert testimony
corroborating their explanation; (C) show that they were
diligent in their efforts to seek medical treatment as soon as
possible; (D) demonstrate that the child exhibits only a
single injury with no other marks or bruises consistent with
abuse or mistreatment; (E) exhibit an appropriate amount
of emotion or concern at the fact-finding hearing; and, when
possible, (F) provide an adequate and plausible alternative
explanation for the injury, including the presence of an
additional caretaker or a rare medical condition that would
cause such injuries. If one or more of the six factors are
missing, it is likely that the court will take notice and enter
a finding of abuse or neglect. 72 The first three factors are
perhaps the most crucial in determining whether the court
will find that the respondent parents have met their burden
of explanation. 73 Though the last three are also given
70. Id. at 529.
71. Id. at 530. As noted in the case, the test "is 'only' 85% accurate." Id. The

court weighed the accuracy of the test with the other evidence of abuse and
found that the parents failed to rebut the presumption of parental
responsibility. Id.
72. See, e.g., In re Peter R., 779 N.Y.S.2d 137, 138-40 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
2004) (noting that parents did not timely seek medical treatment and that the
mother's testimony contained "significant inconsistencies"); In re Michael A.,
560 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1990) (noting the presence of
multiple injuries and bruises). But see In re A.G. & KG., Jr., N.Y. L.J., Jan. 13,
1992, at 25-26 (Fain. Ct. 1992) (dismissing petitions against both parents where
court takes note of all six relevant factors).
73. See, e.g., In re Daqwuan G., 814 N.Y.S.2d 723, 725 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
2006) (inconsistent account of events); Comm'r of Soc. Servs. of New York ex rel.

2009]

FAILING TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF

605

weight, they are less frequently cited in res ipsa abuse and
neglect cases. 74 Because there are no uniform or standard
criteria for applying the presumption, inconsistencies arise
in its application. Therefore, in order to achieve more
consistency, precision, and transparency in their decisions,
family and supreme courts should rely on the factors more
explicitly than they currently do.
III. INCONSISTENCIES IN THE APPLICATION
OF THE PRESUMPTION

One of the greatest problems with the application of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine in Article Ten proceedings is its
inconsistent implementation. In a practice manual for law
guardians, Gary Solomon explains:
Even assuming that the Legislature has achieved a fair balance of
interests [between protecting children and preserving the family
unit] in Article Ten, any lawyer who practices in Family Court will
soon learn that, in a forum in which bureaucratic and judicial
decision-making can be largely subjective, in practice Article Ten's
provisions are only as fair and effective as the social services
75
officials, lawyers and judges who interpret and implement them.

This is particularly true in res ipsa cases of abuse or
neglect, where the statutory presumption is applied
inconsistently with respect to socio-economic status and
families with multiple caretakers.
A. Inconsistency with Regard to Socio-Economic Status
In many cases, parents consult qualified child welfare

Jullian L. v. Hyacinth L., 619 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763-64 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994)
(expert medical testimony); In re C. Children, 616 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645 (App. Div.
2d Dep't 1994) (medical treatment not promptly sought); In re Shetonya W., 610
N.Y.S.2d 235, 236 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1994) (expert medical testimony); In re
Jacinta J., 529 N.Y.S.2d 661, 661-62 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1988) (lack of
consistent explanation).
74. See, e.g., In re F. Children, 577 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1991) (no emotion at fact-finding hearing); In re William W., Jr., 510 N.Y.S.2d
370, 371 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1986) (injury that is indicative of abuse); In re
Mathew D., 641 N.Y.S.2d 526, 527 (Fain. Ct. 1996) (plausible alternative
explanation).
75. 1 SOLOMON, supra note 28, at 1.
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attorneys and experienced medical experts in order to
explain their child's injuries. Additionally, the standard of
medical care and the time it takes to administer such care
become important in res ipsa cases, because seeking
adequate medical treatment is a factor that courts consider
when deciding if parents' behavior is consistent with abuse
or neglect. Ultimately, parents with more financial
resources at their disposal have an advantage when trying
to defend themselves against a claim of res ipsa abuse or
neglect, because they have access to more qualified lawyers
and medical experts, and better medical care. While it may
be true that those with more resources have an advantage
in most legal proceedings, it is especially true in res ipsa
cases where parents must rebut a presumption of
responsibility against them and where
the standard of proof
76
is a preponderance of the evidence.
All
respondents
are
guaranteed
the
effective
representation of counsel at Article Ten proceedings, 77 but
respondents who can afford well-trained and experienced
attorneys may enjoy the additional benefits of a better
78
defense and a lawyer with a smaller caseload.
Furthermore, parents with access to excellent medical care
may be able to rebut the presumption with more ease than
those without, because the court takes note of parental
concern with respect to their child's injuries and, therefore,
the standard and adequacy of the medical care
administered. Parents lacking health insurance or other
resources may not be able to obtain the same services as
parents with health insurance. Most importantly, because
parents rebutting the presumption often present expert
medical testimony to the court, parents able to afford a
"battle of the experts" are much more likely to rebut the
79
presumption than those who lack this ability.
76. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(b)(i) (McKinney Supp. 2008); see also In re
Philip M., 624 N.E.2d 168, 172 (N.Y. 1993).
77. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 2008); see, e.g., In re Erin
G., 527 N.Y.S.2d 488, 490 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1988).
78. See Cynthia Feathers, Julia BB: An Appellate Attorney's Perspective,
ALBANY COUNTY BAR ASS'N NEWSL. (Albany County Bar Ass'n, Albany, N.Y.),
Jan. 2008, at 19 ("Another atypical aspect of the case was that the parents had
retained superb private counsel at trial .... As middle-class professionals, the
parents would not have qualified for assigned counsel.") (parentheses omitted).
79. See, e.g., In re Madeline A., 866 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (App. Div. 1st Dep't

2009]

FAILING TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF

607

In the case of In re BW, the respondent parents
retained their own counsel, obtained exceptional medical
treatment immediately, and presented testimony from
three highly qualified physicians.8 0 In doing so, they were
able to rebut the presumption against them. In his decision,
Westchester Family Court Judge Spitz elaborated on the
measures the family made to ensure the safety of their
child, but in the process, he also revealed clues about their
socio-economic status and access to resources. The child's
father was a teacher in Westchester County, and the
mother was a paralegal who, at the time, worked in
Manhattan. While the child was represented by a courtappointed law guardian, the parents were able to hire
private counsel.81 Shortly after realizing that their baby
was not well, the father called the child's doctor and then
took the child to the emergency room. The mother went to
work in Manhattan. However, when she discovered that her
baby required a "lumbar puncture or spinal tap," she
immediately "hired a private car to transport her from
Manhattan" to the hospital.8 2 The physician at the hospital
later concluded that the child's injuries had resulted from
shaken baby syndrome and alerted the local child
83
protection agency.
At the proceedings, a battle of the experts ensued. The
Department of Social Services presented the testimony of
2008) (finding that parents "presented no medical evidence of their own,"
despite their argument that the family court's "compensation directive for a
neurologist's expert services was inadequate"); In re C. Children, 616 N.Y.S.2d
644, 645 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994) ("[M]other offered no medical evidence to
rebut the testimony of the doctors."); In re James P., 525 N.Y.S.2d 38, 40 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1988) (noting that mother "offered no medical evidence to rebut
the testimony of the doctors"); In re Mathew D., 641 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (Fain.
Ct. 1996) (noting that test to determine if child had brittle bone disease was
"ultimately authorized at public expense"). But see In re Julia BB., 837 N.Y.S.2d
398, 404-11 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2007) (holding that child was not abused after
six treating physicians testified and offered different theories for child's
injuries); In re Robert "YY," 605 N.Y.S.2d 418, 419-20 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1993)
(finding that parents rebutted the presumption where three different physicians
testified and "[a]ll of the physicians who testified agreed that Robert's injury
could have been caused accidentally").
80. N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14, 1995, at 32 (Fam. Ct. 1995).

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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two medical experts, a caseworker, a police officer, and the
family's daycare providers, while the respondents presented
the testimony of three different medical experts, in addition
to the family's pediatrician.8 4 Among the physicians
testifying for the Department of Social Services were the
opthamologist who evaluated
the child and the
neurosurgeon who performed surgery on the child. The
court noted that the neurosurgeon in charge of the child's
care was the Chief of Pediatric Neurosurgery at New York
Medical College.8 5 To refute their testimony, the respondent
parents presented three expert witnesses: the Chief of
Pediatric Neurology at St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital
Center, the Director of the Division of Pediatric
Neurosurgery at Montefiore Medical Center, and an
"Assistant Professor at Columbia University College of
Physicians and Surgeons in the Department of Diagnostic
Neuroradiology."86 The court ultimately granted more
weight and credibility to the respondent's experts, lauding
their professional credentials.
The parents also used the child's access to exceptional
medical care and the presence of a number of "protective
devices" in their home to demonstrate their constant
concern and dedication.8 7 Judge Spitz observed that the
child "received good neonatal and post natal care and had
received all required vaccinations. The parents also used
protective devices at home including gates, electrical outlet
covers, and a sound monitoring system."88 It is important to
note, however, that these are tools utilized by parents who
can afford them. Reading between the lines of this case, it
seems apparent that the parents were able to rebut the
presumption in part because they could afford to do so.
They were able to afford to baby-proof their home, obtain
immediate medical treatment for their child, retain private
counsel, and engage in a battle of experts, which ultimately
led to their legal victory. Parents unable to afford these
services face scrutiny from the court, and therefore may be
unable to rebut the presumption.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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B. The Problem of Multiple Caretakers
The inconsistent application of the presumption
becomes evident when analyzing cases in which multiple
caregivers were present during the time period when the
child sustained injuries. If a child is not always in the
custody of a parent during the time period in question, that
parent may still face a prima facie case of abuse. One family
court held that the rule with respect to multiple caregivers
is that "[i]f the child is primarily in the custody of the
parent, during the critical period when the injury was
sustained, the rule should apply, unless the parent proves
that the injury occurred at a time when the child was not in
his custody. ' '8 9 This allows courts the discretion to find both
parents abusive if they shared responsibility for the child
during the critical time period, even if only one of them
actually inflicted the injuries. 90 Consequently, the identity
of the abuser does not need to be ascertained in order to
hold both parents culpable. 91 Traditionally, this meant that
all the caretakers responsible for the child within the
critical time period were usually found abusive. Courts that
were unable to discern conclusively which parent or
caregiver was responsible for the child simply found that all
of them were abusive or neglectful, unless they were able to
prove otherwise.92
More recently, however, courts have not held parents or
caregivers responsible in cases involving many different
caregivers. This is because the involvement of a large
number of caretakers alone acts to rebut the statutory
presumption with regard to any particular caretaker. For

89. In re Tara H., 494 N.Y.S.2d 953, 958 (Fam. Ct. 1985); see also In re
Jessica Z., 515 N.Y.S.2d 370, 377 (Fam. Ct. 1987).
90. In re Tara H., 494 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
91. In re Ruth McI., 528 N.Y.S.2d 385, 385 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1988).
92. See, e.g., In re Najam M., 648 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560-61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1996) (finding that both parents abused daughter); In re Tyeasia C., 641
N.Y.S.2d 673, 674 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1996) (finding that both mother and

father abused daughter where child did not reside with father all the time); In
re Cynthia V., 462 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1983) (finding that
both mother and father neglected their children); In re Ulster County Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 1995 WL 519189, at *3, 6 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. Mar. 24, 1995) (noting that
each parent denied blame, but finding child to have been abused and neglected
by both parents).
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example, in the case of In re Ashley RR., the parents of two
young sexually abused girls were not held responsible,
because approximately forty different adults had access to
the girls during the period in which they were abused. 93
The daughters were in the care of their maternal
grandmother the majority of the time, but they were also
exposed to her friends and family as well as daycare
providers. 94 Similarly, in the case of In re Tony B., Jr., the
court held that the Erie County Department of Social
Services had failed to establish a prima facie case of abuse
against the caretakers. 95 Although the three-month-old
child had a fractured skull, he had been in the care of many
different people, including the respondents, in the fortyeight hours prior to his injury. The court dismissed the
petition against the caretakers, because the agency failed to
establish a case "against any particular person or
persons ."96
While it is logical to not hold parents responsible for
abuse when their children have been exposed to numerous
caretakers, this rule is not applied consistently in the
context of fewer caretakers. Sometimes when there are only
a few caretakers, courts hold all possible caretakers
responsible; however, sometimes they do not. This
discrepancy is evident in recent cases. In the case of In re
FantaysiaL., the parents shared custody of their three-anda-half-year-old daughter. 97 Although she frequently saw her
father, who lived with his mother (the child's paternal
grandmother), the child primarily resided with her mother
and stepfather. When the young girl contracted gonorrhea,
the burden was on all four adults to provide an explanation
that would rebut the presumption against them. 98 The court
explained "[t]hat the evidence showed that the child could

93. 816 N.Y.S.2d 580, 583-84 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2006).
94. Id. at 583.
95. 841 N.Y.S.2d 419, 419-20 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2007).
96. Id.; see also Veronica C. v. Carri6n, 866 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50-51 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 2008) (holding that child care provider and child's parents acted as
caretakers within the twenty-four hours prior to the diagnosis of child's injury
and thus, child protection agency failed to make prima facie case "against
anyone in particular").
97. 828 N.Y.S.2d 497, 499 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2007).
98. Id.
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have contracted the disease in either household," and that
this "neither defeated the petitioner's prima facie case nor
precluded application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." 99
It would have been almost impossible for all four adults to
explain the girl's gonorrhea.
Yet, in a similar case, a family court used different
reasoning altogether. In Albany County Department for
Children, Youth & Families v. Ana P., the victim was a
three-year-old girl with gonorrhea. 0 0 After both her father
and mother tested positive for the sexually transmitted
disease, the Department for Children, Youth & Families
filed a petition claiming that both parents were abusive. 101
However, after its medical expert "testified as to the
unlikeliness of an adult female transmitting the disease to
a three year old child in a sexual manner," the Department
conceded that the mother had not transmitted the disease
to her daughter. 10 2 Nonetheless, it argued that based on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the mother was responsible for
her daughter's abuse. The court refused to apply the
doctrine to the mother, holding that the petitioner failed to
meet its burden of proof with regard to her because she was
not able to transmit the disease to her child.' 0 3 The court
also went a step further and held that the mother was not
responsible, because the doctrine does not "extend to
situations that would implicate a person based on a theory
of facilitation, accessorial conduct or a failure to protect. '' 104
This case is particularly remarkable due to the court's
refusal to extend the doctrine to charge the mother with
child abuse. It is far more common that all caretakers are
05
held responsible.

99. Id.

100.
101.
102.
103.

827 N.Y.S.2d 525, 526 (Fain. Ct. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 528-29.

104. Id. at 528.
105. See, e.g., In re Seamus K, 822 N.Y.S.2d 168, 171-72 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
2006) (holding both parents responsible for abuse where numerous family
members had access to child); In re Keone J., 766 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193-94 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 2003) (finding that mother, boyfriend, and father abused child
where child visited with father, but was under mother's care); In re Najam M.,
648 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560-61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1996) (finding that both parents
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As Professor Merril Sobie explained, "In practice, when
the case involves multiple respondents or others who may
be guilty, the presumption may lead to apparently
incongruous results.... The upshot is that several innocent
parties along with the guilty party may become trapped by
the presumption."'10 6 In a rare but strong dissent in the case
of In re Seamus K, Justice Crew III argued that the
presumption cannot fairly be extended to this degree
without the finding being based "upon pure conjecture.' 1 07
He maintained that when a "number of individuals have
access to the child during the relevant time period and it is
equally likely that the underlying injuries could have been
inflicted by any one of those individuals as the other, the
presumption simply cannot be invoked."' 08 Nevertheless,
courts have chosen to invoke the presumption when there
are multiple caretakers and, in the process, they have failed
to demonstrate consistency in their decisions.
IV. GREATER CONSEQUENCES OF THE APPLICATION OF THE
RES IPSA PRESUMPTION AND THE RESULTING FINDINGS OF
ABUSE AND NEGLECT

Parents face a number of challenges in cases where a
child protection agency utilizes the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine to prove abuse or neglect. Because the child
welfare system "recognizes that the health and safety of
children is of paramount importance," 10 9 matters are
necessarily resolved with the child's best interests in mind.
This ultimately means that respondents lack the
protections granted to defendants in criminal proceedings.
Ulster County Family Court Judge Mary M. Work
articulated this best when she wrote:
[T]he respondents receive fewer procedural protections than in

abused daughter); In re Tyeasia C., 641 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1996) (holding that both mother and father abused daughter where child did
not reside with father all the time).
106. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046 cmt. (McKinney Supp. 2008) (Prof. Merril

Sobie, Supplementary Practice Commentaries).
107. In re Seamus K., 822 N.Y.S.2d at 175 (Crew III, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
108. Id.
109. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 384-b(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2008).
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criminal proceedings where incarceration is a possibility. There is
no right to jury trial. The standard of proof is preponderance of the
evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. The right to
confrontation is diluted by allowing the child's out-of-court
statement to be received in evidence. The exclusionary rule does
not apply in child protective proceedings. The most severe
disposition available is placement of the child for one year with
extensions of placement granted only if shown that the parents are
likely to continue to abuse and neglect the child. The goal in
Family Court is to protect the child and to rehabilitate, not punish,
the parent. 110

A fact-finding hearing in which the rules of evidence
are relaxed and the standard of proof is weak places
parents in a difficult situation. Furthermore, a subsequent
finding of abuse or neglect stigmatizes parents with respect
to future proceedings and often results in grave
consequences.
A. Consequences that Result from Testifying (or Failingto
Testify) at the Fact-FindingHearing
If parents choose to testify at the fact-finding hearing,
the court may find that their testimony is not credible and
that their explanation is insufficient to rebut the
presumption. 111 Additionally, parents may feel pressured to
omit details of the incident or refrain from telling the truth,
because they fear that they will implicate another family
member or caretaker. 112 Even if parents testify that another

110. In re Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 1995 WL 519189, at *5 (N.Y.
Fain. Ct. Mar. 24, 1995) (citations omitted); see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §

1046(b)(i) (McKinney Supp. 2008); In re Tammie Z., 484 N.E.2d 1038, 1038-39
(N.Y. 1985).
111. See, e.g., In re Kortney C., 770 N.Y.S.2d 758, 759-60 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
2004) (noting that the medical expert's testimony contradicted the caregiver's
explanation); In re Marc A., 754 N.Y.S.2d 45, 47 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2003)
(noting that the parents' explanations lacked credibility).
112. In the case of In re Seamus K., the parents tried to rebut the
presumption by showing that several family members had access to the child.
The court noted, "at the hearing, respondents never specifically accused any
particular adult family member of inflicting the injury." 822 N.Y.S.2d 168, 172
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 2006). Yet, there are many obvious reasons why parents
would not accuse members of their extended family of abusing their child, i.e.,
parents may not feel comfortable throwing their extended family members
under the proverbial bus to save their own family unit.
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caretaker was responsible, they still may risk a finding of
neglect or abuse, because they knew or should have known
that the caretaker would place the child in danger, 113
or
because they failed to protect the child from harm.
Interestingly, if both parents decide to testify and each
parent attempts to implicate the other, they both risk a
finding of abuse or neglect. For instance, in the case of In re
Ulster County Department of Social Services, both parents
testified that they did not have "exclusive control" of the
child and that neither had seen the other injure the child in
any way. 114 Despite their testimony, the court held that:
Applying § 1046(a)(ii) against both parents and finding both guilty
works a terrible hardship on an innocent parent as well as on the
infant who may be denied the care and companionship of a fit
parent. But the legislature believed the risk of returning a child to
an abusive parent outweighed the burden on the innocent parent.
In criminal law, a different value judgment has been applied:
better the guilty go free than the innocent be convicted. In a
criminal case analogous to this case, the Court of Appeals reversed
the conviction of two caretakers accused of shaking a baby to
death because the1 15People had been unable to prove which had
done the shaking.

Yet, here the court found that the child had been
abused and neglected by both parents, based on the theory

113. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(e)(ii), (f)(i)(B) (McKinney Supp.
2008); In re Dawn D., 612 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994) (holding
that "even if [the mother] had not physically abused [the child], the court could
have properly determined that she had failed to protect [her] from physical
danger"); In re Robert "YY," 605 N.Y.S.2d 418, 420 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1993)
(holding that a parent may be responsible "for the abusive acts of another party,
including those of the other parent, if he or she 'knew or should reasonably have
known' that the child was in danger").
114. 1995 WL 519189, at *3; cf. In re Dep't of Soc. Servs., 612 N.Y.S.2d 217,
218 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994) (discussing a situation where both parents
blamed one another for placing child's hands on burner).
115. In re Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 1995 WL 519189, at *5. It is
interesting to note that approximately three decades earlier, while reviewing
the first case to apply the doctrine, In re S, George J. Alexander argued that
parents essentially bear the burden of proving that they are innocent. He
argued, "[wihile one can sympathize with the court's motive it seems doubtful
that the situation is far different from criminal proceedings in which it would be
equally expeditious to make a defendant exculpate himself." George J.
Alexander, 1965 Survey of New York Law: Family Law, 17 SYRACUSE L. REV.
318, 323 (1965).
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that it is better to remove a child from the care of both
parents, even if only one is potentially abusive, than to risk
the possibility of further abuse. 116 Thus, parents are forced
to defend themselves in a system that is largely skewed
against them. It is justifiably skewed, however, in favor of
safeguarding their children. Because the ultimate goal of
protecting children is of extreme importance, parents must
overcome harsh scrutiny from the court when testifying at
Article Ten proceedings.
However, respondents who decide not to testify when
trying to rebut the presumption of parental culpability are
at great risk of a determination of abuse or neglect, because
it is their burden to come forth with an explanation for
their child's injuries. When respondents do not testify, the
court is allowed to "draw the strongest inference against7
[them] that the opposing evidence in the record permits.""
When a court possesses some evidence that a child was
abused, and then takes note of the respondent's failure to
testify, 1a18negative inference against the respondent usually
follows.
Of course, respondents are free to invoke their
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 119 New
York State courts have repeatedly held that the res ipsa
presumption does not violate a respondent's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination because the
decision to testify "is a tactical, not a compelled one," where
the presumption may be rebutted in alternate ways and by
presenting additional evidence. 120 Nonetheless, courts will
116. In re Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 1995 WL 519189, at *5-6.
117. Comm'r of Soc. Servs. v. Philip De G., 450 N.E.2d 681, 683 (N.Y. 1983).
There are many cases that utilize this inference. See, e.g., In re Jasmine A., 795
N.Y.S.2d 87, 89 (App. Div 2d Dep't 2005); In re Randy V., 786 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 2004) (quoting In re Megan G., 737 N.Y.S.2d 684, 687 (App.
Div. 3d Dep't 2002)); In re Themika V., 613 N.Y.S.2d 708, 709 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1994).
118. See, e.g., Nassau County Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Dante M. v. Denise
J., 661 N.E.2d 138, 141 (N.Y. 1995); In re Jasmine A., 795 N.Y.S.2d at 89; In re
Randy V., 786 N.Y.S.2d at 825; In re Ashley M., 653 N.Y.S.2d 163, 164 (App.
Div. 3d Dep't 1997).
119. In re Fred S., 322 N.Y.S.2d 170, 177 (Fam. Ct. 1971).
120. In re Roman, 405 N.Y.S.2d 899, 904 (Faro. Ct. 1978). See also William
Wesley Patton, Rethinking the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Child
Abuse Dependency Proceedings: Might ParentsBe Their Own Worst Witnesses?,
11 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 101, 145 (2007). The res ipsa presumption has
also been challenged on other constitutional grounds. New York State courts
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still penalize parents who choose to invoke their right
against self-incrimination. As the court in the case of In re
Fred S. held, "Silence is not always golden. . . . The
respondents have a right to stand mute. If they do so,
however, . . . they run the great risk of having the prima
facie case established . . . against them with finality,
particularly as in most cases of this nature, there are no
outside witnesses."'121 It seems, therefore, that any
ambiguity about parental culpability means that parents
are damned if they do testify, and damned if they do not
testify: in the former case they face an almost irrebuttable
presumption of culpability, and in
the latter they face the
strongest inference against them. 122
B. Consequences that Result from a Subsequent Finding of
Abuse or Neglect
Once a court has entered a finding of abuse or neglect
against a parent, many other negative consequences may
flow from that decision. A finding of abuse or neglect
"constitutes a permanent, and significant, stigma ... [that]
might indirectly affect [a parent's] status in potential future
proceedings."'' 23 This is particularly true with regard to
have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the res ipsa presumption. See,
e.g., In re Christopher Anthony M., 848 N.Y.S.2d 711, 714 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
2007) (holding that respondent father's assertion that section 1046(a)(ii) was

unconstitutional was academic because father was able to rebut the
presumption); In re Vance A., 432 N.Y.S.2d 137, 141-42 (Fam. Ct. 1980) (finding
that although deciding whether to testify at an Article Ten proceeding presents
a parent with a difficult choice, imposing this choice is not a violation of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); In re J.R., 386 N.Y.S.2d
774, 780 (Fam. Ct. 1976) (finding that rebuttable presumptions like the one
found in section 1046(a)(ii) do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
121. In re Fred S., 322 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
122. The issue of self-incrimination becomes increasingly important for
parents facing criminal charges as well as an Article Ten proceeding. To avoid
issues of self-incrimination, Article Ten allows for concurrent trials.
Additionally, family courts have the discretion to grant testimonial immunity in
any subsequent criminal proceedings. Parents are not always granted
concurrent trials or testimonial immunity, however, and are often forced to
choose between presenting a complete defense or having their testimony used
against them in criminal proceedings. If they do choose to testify, their
statements in family court are admissible and discoverable in criminal court. If
they choose not to testify, they face the strongest inference against them in
family court. See id. at 175-76; 1 SOLOMON, supranote 28, at 212-13.
123. In re H. Children, 548 N.Y.S.2d 586, 587 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1989); see
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derivative findings of neglect or abuse. In an Article Ten
hearing, evidence that proves abuse or neglect of one child
is admissible in determining whether other children under
the parent's care were abused or neglected. 124 Once a court
determines that one child was abused or neglected, that
evidence often leads to derivative findings of neglect or
125 It is
abuse for other children under that parent's care.
extremely likely that a derivative finding will be made even
when there is no evidence that a second child has been
harmed, because "a derivative finding of neglect [or abuse]
should be made where the evidence as to the directly
abused or neglected child demonstrates such an impaired
level of parental judgment as to create a substantial risk of
1 26
harm for any child in their care."'
In some cases, parents who had previously attempted to
rebut the presumption by vehemently denying the abuse
are later required to admit to the abuse in order to
successfully undergo and complete treatment for their
behavior, and eventually obtain custody of their children or
visitation rights. In other words, in some cases, once the
court enters a finding of abuse, parents who had previously
denied responsibility for the child's injuries must accept
responsibility for those injuries so that they may prove that
they have learned from, and made efforts to overcome, such
acts; only then will they regain custody of their children. In
re Ashley M. is illustrative. 127 By presenting the daughter's
out-of-court statements in addition to validating expert
also In re Jason S., 826 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2007); In re
Daqwuan G., 814 N.Y.S.2d 723, 725 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006).
124. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 2008).
125. See, e.g., In re Sidney FF., 844 N.Y.S.2d 453, 454-55 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
2007); In re Quincy Y., 714 N.Y.S.2d 293, 294-95 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2000);
New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel. H. and J. Children v. Carmen J., 619
N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994); In re Edwards, 335 N.Y.S.2d 575,
577-78, 582 (Fam. Ct. 1972). Cf. In re Kadiatou B., 861 N.Y.S.2d 20, 20-21 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 2008) (affirming the dismissal of a derivative neglect petition
against parents where underlying findings of abuse were "remote in time" and
"reached solely on the basis of the legal construct res ipsa loquitur').
126. In re Dutchess County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 661 N.Y.S.2d 670, 671 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1997); see also In re F. Children, 707 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 2000); In re Vincent M., 597 N.Y.S.2d 309, 314 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1993).
127. 683 N.Y.S.2d 304 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1998); 653 N.Y.S.2d 163 (App.
Div. 3d Dep't 1997).
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testimony, the Chemung County Department of Social
Services established that a father had sexually abused his
daughter.128 The father then attempted to rebut the res ipsa
presumption by showing that there was "no medical or
physical evidence of abuse" and that the claims against him
"may have emanated from his wife's antipathy towards
him."'129 The family court, however, found that he had
sexually abused his three-year-old daughter. 130 Noting that
he failed to testify, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division
affirmed the family court's decision, and thereby found that
it was permitted to make the strongest negative inference
against the father allowed by the opposing evidence.' 3 ' A
dispositional order was then entered requiring the father to
complete a sexual offender treatment program. 13 2 According
to the Appellate Division:
[The father] attended all of the program's sessions and completed
the homework assignments, [but] he refused to take responsibility
for his behavior by admitting that he sexually abused his
daughter. As a consequence, he was terminated from the program
since, without such an acknowledgment, treatment efforts could
not be successful. . . . Following an evidentiary hearing, Family
Court found that respondent had willfully violated the order of
disposition by not successfully completing
the program and
133
sentenced him to a six-month jail term.

On appeal, the father argued that he did not want to
acknowledge that he abused his daughter because he was
protected by his right against self-incrimination.13 4 The
court rejected this argument, however, citing the
therapeutic nature of the program and finding that the
right against self-incrimination only protects one from the
actual possibility of criminal prosecution. 135 In other cases,
128. In re Ashley M., 653 N.YS.2d at 164.
129. Id. at 165.
130. Id. at 164.
131. Id. at 164-65.
132. In re Ashley M., 683 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
133. Id. at 304-05.
134. Id. at 305.
135. Id.; see also In re Kristi "AA," 742 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
2002) (affirming family court's finding "that respondent had willfully violated
its order of disposition and sentenced him to a six-month jail sentence" because
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courts have cited a parent's denial of, or inability to take
responsibility for, their136child's injuries as a reason to keep
the child in foster care.
While accepting responsibility for abuse may be the
best way to begin treatment for abusive parents, this seems
somewhat problematic. Parents attempting to rebut the res
ipsa presumption maintain their innocence during the factfinding hearing. However, once the court enters a finding of
abuse or neglect, those same parents must then shift tactics
and follow a dispositional order, which may involve
engaging in treatment programs that require them to
openly admit to wrongdoing. If parents fail to admit to
wrongdoing, they risk extending their children's foster care
placement, and subsequently risk the termination of their
parental rights. If a child has been in foster care for fifteen
of the past twenty-two months, the child protection agency
is required to file a petition to terminate parental rights,
unless: (1) the child is in the care of a relative; (2) there are
compelling reasons otherwise; or (3) the agency has not
provided the parents with the necessary services to ensure
the safe return of the child to their care. 137 Thus, a failure
to quickly admit to wrongdoing as part of a depositional
order could lead to the filing of a petition to terminate
parental rights.
The negative consequences that flow from the
application of the res ipsa presumption place parents who
attempt to defend themselves against claims of abuse or
neglect under harsh scrutiny. Parents who fail to testify
face the strongest negative inference against them and an
almost irrebuttable presumption of parental culpability as
they struggle to navigate a child welfare system that is
largely skewed in favor of protecting their children. Yet it is

he refused to sign a contract admitting that he was a sexual offender, and thus
failed to complete the sex offender program required by the order of
disposition); Gary Solomon, 'Res Ipsa" Presumption of Abuse or Neglect: Legal
Background, in TENTH ANNUAL CHILDREN'S LAW INSTITUTE 63, 73-75 (2007).
136. See, e.g., In re F. Children, 707 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33-34 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
2000); In re Theone McR., 657 N.Y.S.2d 707, 707 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1997); In
re Tanya M., 616 N.Y.S.2d 45, 45 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1994).
137. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(3)(l)(i) (McKinney Supp. 2008).
Presumably in this situation, the agency has already provided services to the
parents, but the parents have failed to properly participate in those services,
perhaps by failing to admit responsibility for their actions.
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not enough to focus solely on the burden that the
presumption places upon parents. The burden felt by
parents to overcome the res ipsa presumption against them
ultimately places a harsher burden on their children. It is
the children that bear the weight of any disposition, so it is
imperative that courts make accurate findings before
arriving at their dispositions. When placing a child in foster
care for up to a year-a common Article Ten disposition 13 8there is no room for error: unnecessarily removing a child
from a loving and stable home is damaging, while leaving a
child in an abusive home may be fatal. 139 Most importantly,
it is the child that suffers while languishing in foster

care. 140
V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

During a House of Commons speech, Winston Churchill
stated that "democracy is the worst form of government,
except all those other forms that have been tried from time
to time. ' ' 141 This quote seems particularly pertinent when
applied to the res ipsa presumption. Indeed, in a world
where infants sustain fractured skulls and toddlers contract
gonorrhea, a presumption of parental culpability is a
necessary evil. 142 However, the res ipsa presumption is
problematic at best and inefficient, inconsistent, and unjust
at worst. Yet, the court's appropriation of the doctrine from
negligence law was motivated by the need to protect
138. See, e.g., In re Damen M., 765 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
2003); In re Sharonda S., 752 N.Y.S.2d 898, 898-99 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2003); In
re Tevon C., 720 N.Y.S.2d 178, 178 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2001); In re Tyeasia C.,
641 N.Y.S.2d 673, 673 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1996); In re Shetonya W., 610
N.Y.S.2d 235, 236 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1994).
139. See 1 SOLOMON, supra note 28, at 3-4.
140. In 2003, the median length of stay in foster care in New York was
twenty-eight months. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Child Welfare Outcomes 2003: Annual Report, Ch. VI.
State Data Pages, New York, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cwo03/
statedatanewyork.htm.
141. Richard Rose & William Mishler, Testing the Churchill Hypothesis:
Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives, 16 J. PUB. POLy 29, 31
(1996) (quoting 444 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1947) 206-07).
142. See In re Tony B., Jr., 841 N.Y.S.2d 419 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2007)
(fractured skull); In re Fantaysia L., 828 N.Y.S.2d 497 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2007)
(gonorrhea).
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children abused behind closed doors in the absence of
conclusive proof.143 Although the res ipsa presumption is
difficult to rebut, and it is applied inconsistently and
unfairly, it is the best possible option for dealing with a
horrific social problem. Nonetheless, some reforms should
be implemented to ensure that the doctrine is applied more
consistently and fairly.
A. Allow Parentsto Refrain from Testifying Without
Drawinga Negative Inference
In an Article Ten proceeding, the respondent lacks
protections afforded in criminal proceedings. Whereas
incarceration is a possibility in criminal proceedings, in
Article Ten proceedings the worst possible disposition is
placement of the child in foster care for one year with
extensions granted only if parents are still a risk to the
child. The goal of family court is the rehabilitation, rather
than the punishment, of the parent, with the hopes of
preserving the family unit. 144 For this reason, the standard
of proof is weaker and the rules of evidence are more
flexible in Article Ten proceedings than in criminal
proceedings. 145 The lack of protections granted to parents
biases the proceedings in favor of the court's conception of
what is in the best interests of the child, and consequently,
against parental rights.
Currently, respondents who decide not to testify may
invoke their Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination; however, the court may then draw the
strongest negative inference against them that the opposing
evidence allows. 146 Courts penalize parents twice for failing
to testify-first, because the court will consider their failure
to testify when determining whether the parent has
provided a consistent and plausible explanation for the
child's injuries, and second, because then the court may
draw the strongest negative inference from that silence.
Granting parents the right to testify without drawing this

143. See In re S, 259 N.Y.S.2d 164, 164-65 (Fain. Ct. 1965).
144. In re Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 1995 WL 519189, at *5 (N.Y.

Faro. Ct. Mar. 24, 1995).
145. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046 (McKinney Supp. 2008).

146. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
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inference would be a small concession that would still allow
the system to favor children's best interests. Ultimately, the
court would still consider whether or not the parent
explained the injuries-a burden that obviously cannot be
met as readily in the absence of testimony from the parent.
However, changing the automatic negative inference would
allow parents to remain silent as to their culpability
without risking a finding of abuse or neglect based largely
on their failure to testify. It would also prevent parents
from implicating themselves if they refuse
to testify for fear
of implicating another family member. 147
B. Establish County Funds for Indigent Parentsto Utilize
When Attempting to Rebut the Presumption
Parents who are better equipped to hire experts, retain
private counsel, and obtain medical treatment for their
children are better equipped to rebut the presumption. It is
difficult to overcome this inconsistency, because it is
inherent and mirrored in society. Parents who are better
able to provide for their children are traditionally viewed as
better parents. Therefore, it is not surprising that parents
of a higher socio-economic status may be able to rebut the
presumption more easily than their indigent counterparts.
This bias is reflected in Article Ten proceedings, where:
anomalous results, and a certain measure of unfairness, seem
unavoidable. Whenever a caseworker decides to remove a child or
allow the child to remain at home, or a judge endorses that
decision, personal views concerning child rearing, as well as
subjective or biased impressions of the parent, can contaminate
the decision-making process. Concededly, the same flaws exist in
any bureaucracy or court system. However, given the compelling
liberty interests involved in an Article Ten
proceeding, the
1 48
penalties for human error are rarely as severe.

Because there are compelling liberty interests involved,
namely, the possibility of placing a child in foster care or
the termination of parental rights, there should be some
additional support for indigent parents attempting to rebut
the res ipsa presumption. Moreover, in an Article Ten

147. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
148. 1 SOLOMON, supra note 28, at 3.
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proceeding, the consequences of an unsound decision are
severe. Courts must weigh the possibility of an
unwarranted placement in foster care, and the subsequent
termination of parental rights, against the possibility of
returning the child to a violent, neglectful, and
dysfunctional home. Family courts, therefore, have an
obligation to make the most accurate determination
possible with regard to the
child's future placement in
149
foster care or his own home.
Ideally, counties should establish or increase funds for
parents seeking to hire medical experts to testify at factfinding hearings as well as increase funds to county legal
aid societies willing to defend parents. 150 These funds may
also be used to test for illnesses which would rule out child
abuse. For example, in cases of alleged shaken baby
syndrome, parents may use county funding for a test for
151
osteogenesis imperfecta or "brittle bone disease.'
Additionally, in rare cases, when it is difficult to determine
which parties and witnesses are the most credible, the court
may utilize funds to hire its own independent medical
experts. 52 These funds would not correct the problems that
indigent parents face at Article Ten proceedings or the
inconsistencies in the application of the law, 53but they would
be a step towards leveling the playing field.

149. See In re Ruth McI., 528 N.Y.S.2d 385, 385-86 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1988); In re Valerie Leonice T., 487 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1985);
In re Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 1995 WL 519189, at *5.
150. Telephone Interview with Margaret A. Burt, Esq., Child Welfare
Attorney (Feb. 19, 2008).

151. See, e.g., In re Mathew D., 641 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (Fam. Ct. 1996)
(noting that the test to determine if the child had brittle bone disease was
"ultimately authorized at public expense").
152. See, e.g., In re Peter R., 779 N.Y.S.2d 137, 139 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004)
(indicating that the family court called a medical specialist to testify as its own
independent witness).
153. See Recommendations and Solutions Proposed by Child Welfare Watch,
CHILD WELFARE WATCH, Winter 2005-06, at 3, reprinted in TENTH ANNUAL
CHILDREN'S LAW INSTITUTE 81-82 (2007).
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C. Develop and Consistently Apply New Rules with Respect
to Utilizing the Presumption When There Are Multiple
Caretakers
Due to the rising divorce rates, the frequent presence of
both parents in the workforce, and the evolution of the
family in the United States, it is inevitable that more and
more children will have numerous caretakers throughout
their childhoods. Courts have applied the presumption in
an inconsistent manner with respect to cases that involve
multiple caretakers. 154 New York State family courts and
appellate courts should apply Justice Crew III's rule from
In re Seamus K. 15 5 In his opinion, Justice Crew III argued
that when several people have access to the injured child
during the critical period and "it is equally likely that the
underlying injuries could have been inflicted by any one of
the other, the presumption simply
those individuals as
156
cannot be invoked."'
In cases in which many people had access to the child,
Justice Crew III's rule is particularly easy to apply because
the sheer number of caretakers involved acts to discredit
the use of the presumption, or alternatively, to consider the
presumption immediately rebutted. 157 Conversely, when
there are four or fewer caretakers, application of Justice
Crew III's rule becomes slightly more difficult. In cases in
which there are only a few caretakers, the presumption
should be applied. However, in such cases, the court should
make every attempt to "extinguish" the presumption with
respect to caretakers who could not possibly have abused
the child. 158 All ambiguities should be resolved in favor of

154. See supraPart III.B.
155. 822 N.Y.S.2d 168, 175 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2006) (Crew III, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., In re Tony B., Jr., 841 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
2007) (holding that the petitioners failed to make a prima facie case "against
any particular person or persons," because several people cared for the child in
the forty-eight hours preceding the diagnosis of his injuries); In re Ashley RR.,
816 N.Y.S.2d 580, 583 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2006) (finding the presumption
rebutted where forty adults had access to children who had been sexually

abused).
158. See, e.g., Albany County Dep't for Children, Youth & Families v. Ana
P., 827 N.Y.S.2d 525, 526-27 (Faro. Ct. 2006) (holding that the "res ipsa
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applying the presumption. That is, in the face of ambiguity,
parents should be held to providing an explanation for their
children's injuries. As the family court in the case of In re
Tara H. held, "[i]t is always possible that someone other
than the parent inflicted the injury. ' 159 Yet it is better to
cloak several caretakers in the presumption than to risk
exposing the child to danger.
D. Integrate the Six Factors That Courts Consider In Res
Ipsa Cases Into Case Law
As discussed in Part II above, family and appellate
courts consider six factors when deciding whether a parent
has rebutted the presumption of parental culpability. 160 If a
court recognized these factors explicitly in a decision, then
they will be integrated into the relevant case law. By
integrating these factors into the law, courts will be able to
apply the statutory presumption with more consistency.
When a res ipsa case of abuse or neglect comes before a
family court, the court may simply consider each of the
factors, as well as any other evidence before it, to help
determine whether the parent has rebutted
the
presumption.
Once the factors are integrated into the case law, courts
will decide each res ipsa case before them by evaluating the
factors, and ideally, will achieve greater uniformity in their
decisions. The six factors need not be exclusive, but should
serve as the main criteria for a finding of abuse or neglect
in res ipsa cases. Furthermore, when parents are trying to
rebut the presumption against them, they may look to the
factors for concrete criteria on the statutory presumption. If
the factors are explicitly integrated into case law, parents
will know what judges consider when faced with a res ipsa
claim of abuse or neglect. They will have a better
understanding of what is required of them when they
attempt to rebut the presumption of culpability. This will
force courts to be more transparent and precise in their
application of the doctrine.
presumption ha[d] been extinguished as to the mother" after the court found
that it was unlikely that she transmitted gonorrhea to her young daughter in a
sexual manner).
159. 494 N.Y.S.2d 953, 958 (Fam. Ct. 1985).
160. See supra Part II.
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On the balance, the res ipsa loquitur presumption
codified in section 1046(a)(ii) of the Family Court Act is a
necessary evil that provides judges with the ability to make
common sense inferences in order to ensure the safety of
the children before them. It is biased against parents, but
only to the extent that the child's best interests are
protected and considered paramount. 161 In 1971, a year
after the law was codified, the court in the case of In re Fred
S.162 held that Article Ten:
does not require a legal straight jacket where all the evidence
must fit into predetermined slots of minute exactitude. No branch
of the law is a perfect science. The statute should not prescribe the
rights of society, angrily offended by increases in child abuse and
neglect. This (Article 10 of the Family Court Act) is an enlightened
law for the great and more effective protection of children, their
health, safety and welfare. It is not a vehicle for recrimination
16 3
against parents or their constitutional rights.

Indeed, Article Ten of the Family Court Act balances
the right of the child to a stable home, free from the threat
of violence and harm, with the right of the parents to raise
their children as they see fit.164 It should not be altered, but
rather applied more consistently. The proposals outlined
above provide a starting point for reform of the statutory
presumption's application. Allowing parents to testify
without drawing a strong negative inference is a small
concession. It would allow a parent to avoid a finding of
abuse based largely on his or her failure to testify, but it
would also allow family courts to continue to weigh all of
the evidence before them, including a parent's failure to
present a consistent account of the events that led to the
child's injury. Additionally, creating county funds for
indigent parents to utilize when trying to rebut the
presumption, developing concrete rules with regard to
children in the custody of multiple caretakers, and
integrating the six factors that courts invoke in their
decisions into case law, are steps towards achieving a
higher level of uniformity, transparency, and consistency
161. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAw § 384-b(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2008).

162. 322 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Fain. Ct. 1971).
163. Id. at 182-83.
164. 1 SOLOMON, supra note 28, at 3.
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than is currently achieved.
CONCLUSION

Valerie Leonice T.'s body was covered in bruises, cuts,
belt marks, and cigarette burns. 165 Although she was only
five years old, she revealed that her uncle had raped her in
the past.166 Her mother, Joyce T., was arrested for
endangering
Valerie's
welfare
and
sentenced
to
probation. 167 She subsequently faced an Article Ten
proceeding regarding her daughter's injuries. 68 The court
in this case noted, "It appears that the mother has had a
long history of psychiatric problems, having been in foster
care almost since birth. At the age of 15, while [Joyce] was
living with her mother, she was sexually abused by her
mother's boyfriend, resulting in the birth of Valerie .... ,,169
In the case of In re Valerie Leonice T., it is apparent that
Valerie and Joyce's lives are guided by the indelible imprint
of sexual abuse, physical beatings, and a series of negative
interactions with the foster care system. In applying the res
ipsa doctrine, the court had to decide whether it was better
for Valerie to remain in foster care or to return to Joyce's
dysfunctional and abusive home. 170 Either way, she risked
following in her mother's unfortunate footsteps. The court
stated, "Clearly, the paramount concerns are the best
interests and welfare of the child, which required the court
to take into account the potential threat to the child's
health and safety." 171 Although this case involved
particularly egregious injuries and circumstances, it
exemplifies the core problem in applying the res ipsa
doctrine. The problem is one of balancing the safety
interests of the child with parental rights.
While it is extremely difficult for parents to rebut the
res ipsa presumption, and although numerous negative

165. In re Valerie Leonice T., 487 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1985).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 12.
171. Id.
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consequences arise in the application of the presumption, it
is a sound and justifiable policy in a horrific and difficult
area of law. There is a delicate balance between the state,
the protection of the child, and parental rights in child
welfare law. 172 The res ipsa presumption attempts to
maintain that balance statutorily by assuming that parents
are responsible for their children's unexplained and severe
injuries, because ultimately, "the State's interest in
protecting
abused
children
and the
unthinkable
consequences to the children if they are left in the hands of
abusive parents far outweigh the potential consequences to
v Thus, although there is a balance, the
the parents. 1 73
protection of children remains the supreme goal in Article
Ten proceedings.
Reforms should be made to the rule to ensure the
consistency of its application; however, the presumption
itself should remain intact. Because victims of severe child
abuse are often non-verbal, young, impressionable, and
unable to seek medical treatment on their own, invoking
the presumption is the only possible way that a court may
hold parents responsible for the abuse their children have
suffered. Therefore, the presumption is crucial to the
adjudication of child abuse and neglect cases, in light of the
presence of egregious physical or sexual abuse and a lack of
information about the perpetrator. Still, the inconsistent
application of the doctrine has produced "incongruous
results" with respect to the factors considered in the court's
decision to establish a finding of abuse, socio-economic
status, and among families with multiple caretakers, even
within the same judicial department. 174 The goal now is to
create a more cohesive approach to applying the doctrine
throughout New York State, because although the doctrine
greatly affects parents and governs parental rights, the real
victims of a poorly applied rule are New York's children.

172. Susan Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Parent-Child-StateTriangle in
Public Family Law: The Importance of Private Providers in the Dependency
System, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1397, 1397-98 (1999).
173. In re Diane P., 494 N.Y.S.2d 881, 885 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1985).
174. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046 cmt. (McKinney Supp. 2008) (Prof. Merril
Sobie, Supplementary Practice Commentaries).

